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| Benozzo Gozzoli, Tuomas Akvinolainen, n. 1470-75, Louvre (vasemmalla Aristoteles, oikealla Platon) |
Teologi Petrus
Lombardus (1096–1164) toimi opettajana Notre Damen katedraalikoulussa sekä Pariisin
piispana. Vaikka Pariisiin muodostuvassa yliopistossa oli useita teologeja,
jotka vaikuttivat tulevien vuosisatojen teologisiin keskusteluihin (esim. Hugo
Saintviktorialainen sekä Petrus Abelard), Lombardusta voi hyvällä syyllä pitää 1100-luvun
vaikutusvaltaisimpana teologina. Syy tähän oli hänen Sentenssit-teoksensa (Sentenciae). Hän rakensi teoksensa
systemaattisesti järjestettyjen teologisten ongelmien ympärille sekä kokosi
kirkkoisiltä sitaatteja, jotka olivat relevantteja ongelmien ratkaisemiseksi.
Koska kirkkoisät esittivät useissa tapauksissa vastakkaisia näkemyksiä, pyrki
Lombardus myös esittämään ratkaisun siihen miksi
kirkkoisät olivat erimielisiä. Sentenssit vaikutti suuresti tulevien
vuosisatojen teologiseen keskusteluun, sillä 1200-luvun ensimmäiseltä
puoliskolta lähtien jokaisen teologian maisterin tuli luennoida niistä. Tämä
perinne säilyi aina 1500-luvulle asti. Luennoista muodostetut Sentenssikommentaarit
ovat yksi keskeinen lähde tutkittaessa keskiajan filosofiaa ja teologiaa.
Vaikka tekstejä
kutsuttiin Sentenssikommentaareiksi, saattoi kommentaarien suhde Lombarduksen
tekstiin olla hyvin löyhä. Toisin kuin esimerkiksi Aristoteles-kommentaareissa,
teologit eivät kommentoineet Lombarduksten tekstiä sanasta sanaan. Tarkan
kommentoinnin sijasta päähuomio oli itse Lombarduksen esittämässä ongelmassa,
jonka maisteri pyrki ratkaisemaan.
Toisinaan myös Lombarduksen esittämä ongelma saattoi olla sivuseikka.
Keskeisempi ongelma oli jokin aikalaiskeskustelussa noussut kysymys, joka saattoi
liittyä hyvin löyhästi Lombarduksen esittämään ongelmaan.
Käsillä olevassa
tekstissä Lombardus tarkastelee sitä tiesikö Kristuksen sielu kaiken, minkä
Jumala tietää. Kirkon opin mukaan Kristus oli samaan aikaan sekä täysin Jumala
että täysin ihminen. Lombarduksen kysymys koskee Kristusta ihmisenä. Siten
ongelma ydin on, voiko ihmisen sielu olla kaikkitietävä siten kuin Jumala on.
Lombarduksen mukaan Kristuksen sielu tiesi kaiken, minkä Jumala tietää, mutta sielu
ei tiennyt yhtä täydellisesti. Myöhemmässä traditiossa kysymys Kristuksen
sielun kaikkitietävyydestä oli yleisesti keskusteltu aihe
Sentenssikommentaareissa. Kysymys oli myös filosofisesti kiinnostava, sillä sen
ympärillä keskusteltiin muun muassa siitä kykenikö luotu tuntemaan
äärettömyyden, ja mitä äärettömyyden tietäminen edellytti intellektuaaliselta
kyvyltä. Lisäksi keskustelussa kehiteltiin myös intuitiivisen tiedon ja kokemuksen
käsitteitä.
Tuomas
Akvinolainen (1225–1274) oli dominikaani, joka niin ikään vaikutti muun muassa Pariisin
yliopistossa. Tuomas on ehkä tunnetuin keskiajan teologi, osittain siitä
syystä, että katolinen kirkko nosti Tuomaan kirkon opettajan asemaan 1800-luvulla.
Sydänkeskiajan tavan mukaan myös Tuomas luennoi Lombarduksen Sentensseistä. Nyt
luettava teksti ei kuitenkaan ole Tuomaan Sentenssikommentaarista, vaan Summa
theologiaesta, jonka kolmannen kirjan hän kirjoitti viimeisimpinä elinvuosinaan.
Teksti käsittelee kuitenkin ongelmaa, jonka hän peri Lombarduksen
Sentensseistä.
Tuomaan vastaus
siihen, oliko Kristuksen sielu kaikkitietävä, oli toinen kuin Lombarduksen.
Tuomaan mukaan Kristuksen sielu ei tiennyt kaikkea, minkä Jumala tietää. Kuten
teksti osoittaa, Tuomas katsoi, että Kristuksen sielu oli kuitenkin
kaikkitietävä, koska sana ’kaikkitietävyys’ voidaan ymmärtää kahdella tavalla.
Tuomaan teoriasta keskusteltiin ainakin 1300-luvulle asti. Yhtenä syynä tähän
oli se, että 1200-luvun loppupuolelta lähtien Tuomas oli nostettu dominikaanien
tärkeimmäksi opettajaksi, jota dominikaanien tuli seurata omassa opetuksessaan.
Teksti 1. Petrus Lombardus - Sententiae in IV libris distinctae lib. 3, dist. 14,
cap. 1.
Si anima Christi habuerit sapientiam parem cum Deo, et si omnia scit quae
Deus. Hic quaeri opus est, cum anima Christi esset sapiens sapientia gratuita,
utrum habuerit sapientiam aequalem Deo, sive omnium rerum scientiam habuerit
vel habeat, id est utrum omnia sciat quae Deus scit.
Quibusdam placet quod nec parem cum Deo habeat scientiam, nec omnia sciat
quae Deus, quia in nullo creatura aequatur creatori. Cum igitur anima illa
creatura sit, in nullo aequatur creatori: Ergo nec in sapientia. Non ergo habet
aequalem sapientiam cum Deo, nec scit omnia quae Deus. Item, si anima illa
aequalem habet cum Deo sapientiam, non ergo Deus in omni bono maiorem habet
sufficientiam quam eius creatura.
Inducunt etiam auctoritates ad idem probandum. Ait enim propheta ex persona
hominis assumpti: Mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me, et non potero ad eam.
Quod exponens, Cassiodorus ait: Veritas humanae conditionis ostenditur, quia
homo assumptus divinae substantiae non potest aequari in scientia vel in alio. --
His aliis que pluribus rationibus et auctoritatibus nituntur, qui animam
Christi asserunt nec parem cum Deo habere scientiam, nec omnia scire quae Deus;
quia si omnia scit quae Deus, scit ergo creare mundum, scit etiam creare se
ipsam.
Quibus respondentes, dicimus animam Christi per sapientiam gratis datam, in
Verbo Dei cui unita est, quod perfecte intelligit, omnia scire quae Deus scit,
sed non omnia posse quae potest Deus; nec ita clare ac perspicue omnia capit ut
Deus; et ideo non aequatur creatori suo in scientia, etsi omnia sciat quae et
ipse. Nec eius sapientia aequalis est sapientiae Dei, quia illa multo est
dignior, dignius que et perfectius omnia capit quam illius animae sapientia.
Ergo et in scientia maiorem habet sufficientiam Deus quam anima illa, quae
dignior est omni creatura. -- Ad id Vero quod dicunt, si omnia scit, ergo scit
creare mundum vel se ipsam, respondemus quod scientiam habet creandi mundum,
sed non potentiam; et creandi animam, et scit quomodo Deus se ipsam creavit;
habet ergo scientiam sui creatae, non sui creandae, quia non est creanda, sed
creata.
Käännös (Guilio Silano, The
Sentences.- Book 3, On the Incarnation of the Word. PIMS, 2010, p.
54–55.)
Since Christ's soul was wise by a freely given wisdom, here it is
necessary to ask whether it had wisdom equal to God's, or whether it had or has
knowledge of all things, that is, whether it knows all the things which God
knows
It pleases some to hold that it neither has equal knowledge with God,
nor knows all things which God does, "because the creature is in no way
equated to the Creator." And so, since that soul is a creature, it is in
no way equated to the Creator; and so it is not equal in wisdom. Therefore it
does not have an equal wisdom with God, nor knows all things which God does.
Also, if that soul has equal wisdom with God, then it is not the case that God
has a greater sufficiency than his creature with regard to any good. They also
set forth authorities to prove the same point.
-- It is in these and several other reasons and authorities that they
find support who assert that the soul of Christ neither has an equal knowledge
with God, nor knows all things which God knows; for if it knows all things
which God knows, then it knows how to create the world, and so it also knows
how to create itself.
Responding to them, we say that the soul of Christ, through a freely
given wisdom, in the Word of God, to which it is united and which perfectly
understands, knows all things which God knows, but cannot do all the things
that God can do. Nor does it grasp all things as clearly and sharply as God
does, so that it is not equated to its Creator in knowledge, even though it
knows all things that he knows; nor is its wisdom equal to God's wisdom because
the latter is much worthier and comprehends all things more worthily and
perfectly than the wisdom of that soul. And so, even with regard to knowledge,
God has a greater sufficiency than that soul, which is worthier than any
creature. -- But as to their saying, 'If it knows all things, then it knows how
to create the world or itself,' we respond that it has the knowledge to create
the world, but not the power. So also with regard to the creation of the soul:
it knows how God created it; and so it has knowledge of itself as Created, but
not of itself as creating, because it is not creating, but is already created.
Teksti 2. Sancti Thomae de
Aquino Summa - Theologiae IIIª q. 10 a. 2 co.
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima
Christi in verbo non cognoscat omnia. Dicitur enim Marci XIII, de die autem
illa nemo scit, neque Angeli in caelo neque filius, nisi pater. Non igitur
omnia scit in verbo.
Praeterea, quanto aliquis perfectius cognoscit
aliquod principium, tanto plura in illo principio cognoscit. Sed Deus
perfectius videt essentiam suam quam anima Christi. Ergo plura cognoscit in
verbo quam anima Christi. Non ergo anima Christi in verbo cognoscit omnia.
Praeterea, quantitas scientiae attenditur secundum
quantitatem scibilium. Si ergo anima Christi sciret in verbo omnia quae scit
verbum, sequeretur quod scientia animae Christi aequaretur scientiae divinae,
creatum videlicet increato. Quod est impossibile.
Sed contra est quod, super illud Apoc. V, dignus
est agnus qui occisus est accipere divinitatem et scientiam, Glossa dicit,
idest, omnium cognitionem.
Respondeo dicendum quod, cum quaeritur an Christus cognoscat omnia in
verbo, dicendum est quod ly omnia potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, proprie,
ut distribuat pro omnibus quae quocumque modo sunt vel erunt vel fuerunt, vel
facta vel dicta vel cogitata a quocumque, secundum quodcumque tempus. Et sic
dicendum est quod anima Christi in verbo cognoscit omnia. Unusquisque enim
intellectus creatus in verbo cognoscit, non quidem omnia simpliciter, sed tanto
plura quanto perfectius videt verbum, nulli tamen intellectui beato deest quin
cognoscat in verbo omnia quae ad ipsum spectant. Ad Christum autem, et ad eius
dignitatem, spectant quodammodo omnia, inquantum ei subiecta sunt omnia. Ipse
est etiam omnium iudex constitutus a Deo, quia filius hominis est, ut
dicitur Ioan. V. Et ideo anima Christi in verbo cognoscit omnia existentia
secundum quodcumque tempus, et etiam hominum cogitatus, quorum est iudex, ita
quod de eo dicitur, Ioan. II, ipse enim sciebat quid esset in homine;
quod potest intelligi non solum quantum ad scientiam divinam, sed etiam quantum
ad scientiam animae eius quam habet in verbo. Alio modo ly omnia potest accipi
magis large, ut extendatur non solum ad omnia quae sunt actu secundum
quodcumque tempus, sed etiam ad omnia quaecumque sunt in potentia nunquam reducta
ad actum. Horum autem quaedam sunt solum in potentia divina. Et huiusmodi non
omnia cognoscit in verbo anima Christi. Hoc enim esset comprehendere omnia quae
Deus potest facere, quod esset comprehendere divinam virtutem, et per
consequens divinam essentiam; virtus enim quaelibet cognoscitur per cognitionem
eorum in quae potest. Quaedam vero sunt non solum in potentia divina, sed etiam
in potentia creaturae. Et huiusmodi omnia cognoscit anima Christi in verbo.
Comprehendit enim in verbo omnis creaturae essentiam, et per consequens
potentiam et virtutem, et omnia quae sunt in potentia creaturae.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud verbum
intellexerunt Arius et Eunomius, non quantum ad scientiam animae, quam in
Christo non ponebant, ut supra dictum est, sed quantum ad divinam cognitionem
filii, quem ponebant esse minorem patre quantum ad scientiam. Sed istud stare
non potest. Quia per verbum Dei facta sunt omnia, ut dicitur Ioan. I, et, inter
alia, facta sunt etiam per ipsum omnia tempora. Nihil autem per ipsum factum
est quod ab eo ignoretur. Dicitur ergo nescire diem et horam iudicii, quia non
facit scire, interrogatus enim ab apostolis super hoc, Act. I, hoc eis noluit
revelare. Sicut e contrario legitur Gen. XXII, nunc cognovi quod timeas Deum,
idest, nunc cognoscere feci. Dicitur autem pater scire, eo quod huiusmodi
cognitionem tradidit filio. Unde in hoc ipso quod dicitur, nisi pater,
datur intelligi quod filius cognoscat, non solum quantum ad divinam naturam,
sed etiam quantum ad humanam. Quia, ut Chrysostomus argumentatur, si Christo
homini datum est ut sciat qualiter oporteat iudicare, quod est maius; multo
magis datum est ei scire quod est minus, scilicet tempus iudicii. Origenes
tamen hoc exponit de Christo secundum corpus eius, quod est Ecclesia, quae hoc
ipsum tempus ignorat. Quidam autem dicunt hoc esse intelligendum de filio Dei
adoptivo, non de naturali.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus perfectius
cognoscit suam essentiam quam anima Christi, quia eam comprehendit. Et ideo
cognoscit omnia non solum quae sunt in actu secundum quodcumque tempus, quae
dicitur cognoscere scientia visionis; sed etiam omnia quaecumque ipse potest
facere, quae dicitur cognoscere per simplicem intelligentiam, ut in primo
habitum est. Scit ergo anima Christi omnia quae Deus in seipso cognoscit per
scientiam visionis, non tamen omnia quae Deus in seipso cognoscit per scientiam
simplicis intelligentiae. Et ita plura scit Deus in seipso quam anima Christi.
Ad tertium dicendum quod quantitas scientiae non
solum attenditur secundum numerum scibilium, sed etiam secundum claritatem
cognitionis. Quamvis igitur scientia animae Christi quam habet in verbo,
parificetur scientiae visionis quam Deus habet in seipso quantum ad numerum
scibilium; scientia tamen Dei excedit in infinitum, quantum ad claritatem
cognitionis, scientiam animae Christi. Quia lumen increatum divini intellectus
in infinitum excedit lumen creatum quodcumque receptum in anima Christi, non
solum quantum ad modum cognoscendi, sed etiam quantum ad numerum scibilium, ut dictum
est.
Käännös (Fathers
of the English Dominican Province, Online Edition by Kevin Knight, 2008.)
Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ does not know all
things in the Word. For it is written (Mark 13:32): "But of that day or
hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the
Father." Therefore He does not know all things in the Word.
Objection 2. Further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle the
more he knows in the principle. But God sees His Essence more perfectly than
the soul of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul of Christ knows
in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ does not know all things in the Word.
Objection 3. Further, the extent depends on the number of things known.
If, therefore, the soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word knows, it
would follow that the knowledge of the soul of Christ would equal the Divine
knowledge, i.e. the created would equal the uncreated, which is impossible.
On the contrary, on Apocalypse 5:12, "The Lamb that was slain is
worthy to receive . . . divinity and wisdom," a gloss says, i.e. "the
knowledge of all things."
I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things in
the Word, "all things" may be taken in two ways: First, properly, to
stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done, said, or
thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it must be said that
the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. For every created intellect
knows in the Word, not all simply, but so many more things the more perfectly
it sees the Word. Yet no beatified intellect fails to know in the Word whatever
pertains to itself. Now to Christ and to His dignity all things to some extent
belong, inasmuch as all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been
appointed Judge of all by God, "because He is the Son of Man," as is
said John 5:27; and therefore the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things
existing in whatever time, and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge,
so that what is said of Him (John 2:25), "For He knew what was in
man," can be understood not merely of the Divine knowledge, but also of
His soul's knowledge, which it had in the Word. Secondly, "all
things" may be taken widely, as extending not merely to such things as are
in act at some time, but even to such things as are in potentiality, and never
have been nor ever will be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the Divine
power alone, and not all of these does the soul of Christ know in the Word. For
this would be to comprehend all that God could do, which would be to comprehend
the Divine power, and, consequently, the Divine Essence. For every power is
known from the knowledge of all it can do. Some, however, are not only in the
power of God, but also in the power of the creature; and all of these the soul
of Christ knows in the Word; for it comprehends in the Word the essence of
every creature, and, consequently, its power and virtue, and all things that
are in the power of the creature.
Reply to Objection 1. Arius and Eunomius understood this saying, not of
the knowledge of the soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as was said
above (Question 9, Article 1), but of the Divine knowledge of the Son, Whom
they held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge. But this will not
stand, since all things were made by the Word of God, as is said John 1:3, and,
amongst other things, all times were made by Him. Now He is not ignorant of
anything that was made by Him.
He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour of the Judgment,
for that He does not make it known, since, on being asked by the apostles (Acts
1:7), He was unwilling to reveal it; and, on the contrary, we read (Genesis
22:12): "Now I know that thou fearest God," i.e. "Now I have
made thee know." But the Father is said to know, because He imparted this
knowledge to the Son. Hence, by saying but the Father, we are given to
understand that the Son knows, not merely in the Divine Nature, but also in the
human, because, as Chrysostom argues (Hom. lxxviii in Matth.), if it is given
to Christ as man to know how to judge--which is greater--much more is it given
to Him to know the less, viz. the time of Judgment. Origen, however (in Matth.
Tract. xxx), expounds it of His body, which is the Church, which is ignorant of
this time. Lastly, some say this is to be understood of the adoptive, and not
of the natural Son of God.
Reply to Objection 2. God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly
than the soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all things,
not merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is said to know by
knowledge of vision, but also what ever He Himself can do, which He is said to
know by simple intelligence, as was shown in I, 14, 9. Therefore the soul of
Christ knows all things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision,
but not all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence; and
thus in Himself God knows many more things than the soul of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3. The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the
number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge.
Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has in the
Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of things known,
nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the knowledge of the soul
of Christ in clearness of cognition, since the uncreated light of the Divine
intellect infinitely exceeds any created light received by the soul of Christ;
although, absolutely speaking, the Divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of
the soul of Christ, not only as regards the mode of knowing, but also as
regards the number of things known, as was stated above.
Tuomas Vauran puolesta
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